> CC>But, the proofs vary according to specifics of the God defined. Some
> >can be dispatched with a simple argument from evil,
> As Craig pointed out in his debate with Zindler, the "argument from evil"
> presupposes that there is "evil". He pointed out that the existence of
> evil in turn presupposed objective moral values, which Mackie, on of
> the world's leading atheist philosophers admitted could not be admitted
> to exist without providing a powerful Moral Argument for the existence
> of God!
I'm not Mackie. I deny that it is possible to base an objective morality on
God. I also assert that it *is* possible to have an objective morality. But
you can't do it if you *define* it in terms that exclude the possibility, as
so many people do. If you *define* morality not as "A code of values to
guide one's actions," but rather as "a code of values demanding the setting
aside of what is in fact in one's interests for the sake of the interests of
others," then you cannot have an objective basis for it of *any* kind. The
possibility of an objective basis is thereby defined away.
There are *three* prospective options here, not merely two:
a. Subjectivism/relativism of some sort.
b. Intrinsicism, such as Platonistic theories of the Good. Most
Christian theories are a mixture of intrinsicism and theistic subjectivism
(God is not bound to any pre-definitions as to what is good, therefore it is
merely His *choice* that determines it -- but it is still external to man
and somehow inherently good as well).
c. Objectivism, the view that what is good is determined by the
*factual* relationship between that which is good and the person for whom it
is good. If it is an objective fact that something serves the person's needs
(as determined by his metaphysical and biological nature), then it is
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Tue Jan 18 2000 - 23:15:43 EST