Re: Many Worlds?

Date: Mon Jan 03 2000 - 13:45:14 EST

  • Next message: Wesley R. Elsberry: "Re: Many Worlds?"

    In a message dated 1/3/00 6:09:41 AM Dateline Standard Time, writes:

    MB>Finally, even something as odd as the current Many
     MB>Worlds Hypothesis (used to side-step Fine Tuning)
     MB>is not really new. The materialist Democritus would
     MB>"There are worlds infinite in number and different in size.
     MB>In some there is neither sun nor moon, in others there are
     MB>more than one sun and moon."

    >That's a nice quote. The link to Wheeler's views, though,
    >appears to be missing.

    Contact B&T. They introduce this quotation by speaking of the opponents
    of teleological notions:

    "As with Empedocles we see inklings of some parallels with modern
    evolutionary biology and the 'many worlds' interpretation of quantum
    theory in their writings."

    There's nothing *really* new about all of this. Things either terminate
    in mind/purpose or matter/chance. The matter/chance mentality
    typically needs very large numbers (time, planets, and now even Universes)
    to account for the unlikelihoods found in reality. In the end, it's
    "Take your pick." As Glenn Morton recently posted:

    >Quantum leads one to either need an ultimate observer or a belief (equally
    >based upon faith) of a many-world's hypothesis.

    >"If we remove the problem of observership in quantum mechanics by adopting
    >a Many-Worlds interpretation as may be mandatory if one is to interpret
    >quantum cosmology without introducing the 'Ultimate Observer', then it is
    >possible to reduce the Strong Principle to the Weak one." ~ J. D. Barrow,
    >"Patterns of Explanation in Cosmology," in F. Bertola and U. Curi, editors,
    >The Anthropic Principle, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 9.

    The interesting thing about the many worlds hypothesis is that it
    is a science-killer. No need to explain any contingent fact because with
    an infinite number of universes, one of them would have that fact and
    ours just happens to be it. Instead, we approach contingent facts from
    the teleological perspective, whereby reality is assumed to be rational
    and coherent.


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