I'll be happy to give it a try. First let's start by defining
methodological naturalism (MN). I've always liked Phil's definition:
"... the principle that science can study only the things that
are accessible to its instruments and techniques." --Phil Johnson
I believe we agreed on this definition in the past. If I'm mistaken
about this please let me know.
I can see two ways of interpreting your question. So, let me give
two answers according to those two interpretations. If I still miss
your meaning let me know.
(1) I believe a metaphysical naturalist can practice science in a way
that is consistent with the principle of methodological naturalism.
(2) I believe a metaphysical naturalist can also be a methodological
naturalist and remain consistent with metaphysical naturalism.
The problem is, of course, that some metaphysical naturalist's
do not maintain consistency with methodological naturalism.
But, I believe the best way to handle those cases where
they do not maintain that consistency is to point out the
This is why I said earlier that I thought you were answering
your own question. If A is masquerading as B, then A is
obviously inconsistent with B. The best counter is to expose
Brian Harper | "If you don't understand
Associate Professor | something and want to
Applied Mechanics | sound profound, use the
The Ohio State University | word 'entropy'"
| -- Morrowitz