Re: [asa] ID and Methodological Naturalism

From: David Clounch <david.clounch@gmail.com>
Date: Tue Jun 02 2009 - 11:35:28 EDT

David Campbell,

I think I agree with you. But this leads one to ask, "Isn't promoting one
metaphysical view the equivalent to promoting one religious view?"

We get a hint here ....
Sandra Day O'Conner in the Newdow case argued to extend protection to Mr.
Newdow's view. The reason? She considered a "philosophy" (slightly broader
than a metaphysics?) to have the status of "religious viewpoints". The
point being the state thus has to be neutral and cannot endorse one
particular viewpoint over another. She is in the minority on this idea of
philosophy attaining the status of religion, of course, but that may
change. And it does raise the point of what if she is right?

The Court has said elsewhere that the state cannot promote non-religion over
religion. But what if the non-religion is founded primarily on
metaphysics?

Best Regards,
David Clounch

On Mon, Jun 1, 2009 at 4:19 PM, David Campbell <pleuronaia@gmail.com> wrote:

> >> Although an advocate of non-overlapping magisteria might agree with me
> >> up to this point, I would point out that these other sources of
> >> information such as philosophy and religion have implications for
> >> science. Science is a sub-magesterium, not an independent one.
> >
> > Is this statement -- that science is a sub-magisterium of philosophy or
> > religion, not an independent one -- itself a scientific statement? If
> not,
> > what sort of statement is it? And how do we know that it is true?
>
> It is not scientific; neither are most other statements about the
> scope or applicability of science. It is a philosophical or
> metaphysical or religious statement-these categories are extensively
> overlapping.
>
> I hold it to be true on theological grounds, though I find it hard to
> envision any credible argument that science is not affected by
> metaphysical considerations. The practice of science is possible
> without bothering to think about the underlying assumptions, or while
> holding metaphysical assumptions that are contradicted by the practice
> of science; there are also multiple different philosophical positions
> that are compatible with the practice of science. However, any
> consideration of the assumptions that guide science will be almost
> inherently metaphysical. (Even "it works" makes the assumption that
> practical functioning is a meaningful and desirable criterion; it also
> immediately raises the question of "why?").
>
> --
> Dr. David Campbell
> 425 Scientific Collections
> University of Alabama
> "I think of my happy condition, surrounded by acres of clams"
>
>
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>

-- 
=========================
Jesus showed us God can be both transcendant *and*  physical.   Deistic
Christians want to say God cannot be physical because God is 100%
supernatural.  I don't believe this.
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Received on Tue Jun 2 11:35:59 2009

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