Re: [asa] Natural Agents - Cause and Effect, Non-Natural Agents

From: Gregory Arago <>
Date: Sun May 24 2009 - 09:00:24 EDT

Hi Randy,
We,ve had versions of this discussion before on the ASA listserve and I appreciate that you recognize the difficulties in distinguishing human-made things from non-human-made things. You have, however, if memory serves me correctly, indicated that it is possible to recognize <artificial> things as distinct from <natural> things, while also admitting a grey zone.
Your new acronyms are in some ways helpful and in other ways they further confuse the conversation (just like MN vs. MN). But first things first, I think you,ve mislabelled what you consider to be <the question.> Or at least, I don't see demarcating <science> from <non-science> as the main topic. It puts all of the focus on <science> (as a single, monolithic term) and nothing on the differences between the sciences, which include the use of various methods, strategies, approaches, theories, paradigms, etc.
Randy wrote: <The question is <Can science detect design?> My response was that you [Cameron] must first specify what design we are discussing.>
Another way to phrase your question is <What kind of design can science detect?> Phrasing <the question> this way would offer room for Mike Gene,s positive approach to design and would perhaps satisfy Cameron,s notion that <Darwinism,> which (as an ideology) is inconsistent with Christianity, banished the concept of <design> forever from the academy. I don,t think you,re suggesting that <design> simply *cannot* be a <scientific> concept by definition. Or are you Randy? Those who argue this are predominantly atheists or agnostic anti-theists.
It might do some good for TEs/ECs in terms of kingdom communication to at least accept that *some* kinds of <design> are scientifically detectable. But *which* kinds? Let me be clear though Randy, that I,m not necessarily speaking about <origins of life> or <origins of consciousness> as topics for which <design> should be allowed in <scientific> hypotheses. Surely you personally have <designed> many things in your life, which are amenable to scientific study?
That said, let me address your PT and MT acronyms, what they reveal and what they obscure. First, I think you,ll find IDists welcoming to the idea you suggest of  at least considering <teleology> in scientific realms. Your position, it seems, however, is that <metaphysical is philosophical,> while <physical is scientific>. But I don,t see any reason that responsible overlap between them cannot take place so that philosophy can help science (natural-physical and/or human-social) with the unity of knowledge. Without philosophy, science is just fragmented specialisation by elites (a kind of new priesthood) in our (mass) <scientific age>.
You write:
<PT is design as carried out by a phyiscal entity having some degree of intelligence taking some action mediated by the four fundamental forces (E&M, gravity, strong, and weak).>

Here,s where the problems and obscurantism come in. A <physical entity with intelligence> is not *merely* a physical entity. And saying that such an entity is <natural> is also problematic. This is because, as a character that most under-40 <young peopole> can understand, when he was faced by a deterministic (cf. evolutionary) view of history and the future, once said: <The problem is choice.> You,ve placed human-made and (other) animal-made things in the same category of PT. Certainly people have goals and purposes and plans, and therefore <teleology> is an appropriate concept to apply to the building of temples or pyramids, etc. But you need to recognise non-natural sciences, Randy.
It seems to me that Cameron,s argument, and perhaps Mike Gene,s too, is that <intelligent causes> needn,t be excluded a priori from <science>. Of course, then my questions (which are part of the recent field called PSS - philosophy and sociology of science) then are: <which science?> and <whose science?> And that is a big deal on topics such as whether or not science can *only* study <natural> things. If you,ve read my long critique of Keith Miller,s position, Randy, there I argue that <science> can study non-natural things too. Do you agree with this or not?
You,ve give an example, Randy, where <intelligent causes> are not necessarily the same as <supernatural causes>. So, it doesn,t seem, as you say, that it is <logical to conclude that the intelligent agent in question is divine.> But if the <agent> in question is not <divine> or <supernatural>, I don,t think the IDM,s impact would be as important, nor do I think they would have much ground on which to stand in suggesting that they are offering a <bridge between science and theology>.
I see nothing wrong with elevating the concept of <intelligence> among scientists, or of highlighting the idea of <pattern recognition> or <specification>. Nevertheless, it is in partnering natural-physical scientists (i.e. where <intelligence> is already studied wrt non-human life forms, e.g. animals) with human-social scientists (i.e. where <intelligence> is already studied wrt humanity) that the most significant advancescan be made in the 21st century. Unfortunately, the IDM has not yet taken such steps to create such a union; nor has the leadership of ASA.

--- On Sun, 5/24/09, Randy Isaac <> wrote:

From: Randy Isaac <>
Subject: Re: [asa] Natural Agents - Cause and Effect, Non-Natural Agents
Received: Sunday, May 24, 2009, 3:11 AM

Cameron wrote:
7.  The rest of Keith Miller's argument is more or less the same as Randy Isaac's.  He argues that one cannot infer design without some prior knowledge of the designer or the means.  I would like to make two points about this  (A) Even if he is right, he still has not established that ID tries to "investigate divine action".  Design-inference in ID is not God-inference (all IDers concede that God can be identified with the designer only by non-scientific arguments), and in any case, God's *effects* are not the same as God's invisible *actions*.  ID as a theory, therefore, does not "investigate divine action", in any reasonable sense of that phrase.  But it makes great theological rhetoric, which is why TE people keep using it.  This greatly disappoints me.  (B) The argument that prior knowledge of either the designer or the means is required for design detection strikes me as unsound, but to establish that will require a separate post. 
 So I will leave it here for the moment.
Let me try a differnt path to help explain. The question is "Can science detect design?" My response was that you must first specify what design we are discussing. At the expense of inventing two new acronyms, let's separate design into two aspects:  Physical Teleology (PT) and Metaphysical Teleology (MT). PT is design as carried out by a phyiscal entity having some degree of intelligence taking some action mediated by the four fundamental forces (E&M, gravity, strong, and weak). Examples abound and include a bee hive built by bees, a Mayan temple, an Egyptian pyramid, an ant hill, Olduwan tools, etc. Maybe plant intelligence would also be included though I'm still learning about that. MT is any design in the physical world perpetrated by a metaphyiscal entity with means other than the four fundamental forces. Examples would be angels, demons, spirits, or God carrying out events like speaking or appearing in a dream, sending pigs over a cliff, water
 becoming wine, etc.
Using this terminology, let's rephrase your question and break it into several parts:
Can science detect PT? Yes.
Has science detected PT in the origin and/or development of living cells? No.
Can science detect MT? No.
Has science detected MT in living cells? No.
Note that determining jugs to contain water at one point in time and wine at a subsequent point with no known exchange of liquids doesn't constitute detection of MT. And this example illustrates why science cannot detect MT no matter how much we may wish it could. The effects are not repeatable or obtainable under controlled situations. One can only document the state of the system at various points in time but not trace the Hamiltonian that effects the transition.
As for your being "greatly disappoint[ed]" that some people keep using the "great theological rhetoric" of ID investigating divine action, it really isn't clear what ID is investigating. It has often been noted on this list that it is bewildering that ID advocates usually get very upset when ID is defined as stating "there are patterns in nature that are best explained by the actions of a supernatural (aka divine) agent," insisting that it must be "...intelligent agent" and not supernatural. The only logical reason for such insistence (other than the strategic desire to keep ID non-religious to allow it in the classroom) is that natural (or physical since some people were upset on this list about the definition of natural) agents are a reasonable option. That notion runs into difficulty rather quickly upon reflection. And so, unless one believes in other influential spiritual (i.e. nonphysical) beings with creative powers, it seems logical to conclude
 that the intelligent agent in question is divine. Bewildering indeed.
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Received on Sun May 24 09:00:47 2009

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