Re: [asa] thinking was prosecutors and not that of the judge

From: PvM <pvm.pandas@gmail.com>
Date: Sat May 05 2007 - 14:16:32 EDT

You may be missing the point, the judge merely addressed if ID was
science or not. While the demarcation problem is a much larger issue
about if there can be generic rules defined as to how to recognize if
something is science or not, this issue was much smaller, namely is ID
science (or scientifically relevant).

As I quoted in one of my contributions to PT

<quote>The problem is purely a posteriori: ID has no research program
and no empirical support, so it presents no challenge at all to the
reliance on naturalistical explanatory mechanisms. Laudan thinks talk
of "pseudo-science" is misleading in the absence of a solution to the
demarcation problem; Laudan has no reservations about talk about
"good" and "bad" science as measured by their results and the evidence
on behalf of their claims.</quote>

http://www.pandasthumb.org/archives/2006/06/laudan_demarcat.html

On 5/4/07, David Opderbeck <dopderbeck@gmail.com> wrote:
> Aside from that pragmatic conclusion, though, I think the Judge made a very
> unnecessary foray into the philosophy of science, which was not well done
> either jurisprudentially or philosophically. Note that I'm not suggesting
> the judge was necessarily wrong about where he drew the line of demarcating
> "science" -- like Ted, I think ID ultimately largely loses the demarcation
> game. However, an opinion on the demarcation of science that makes no
> reference at all to developments in the history and philosophy of science
> since Popper, IMHO, is hopelessly shallow and basically useless.

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Received on Sat May 5 14:16:41 2007

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