From: jack syme <drsyme@cablespeed.com>

Date: Fri Jan 01 1988 - 14:34:32 EST

Date: Fri Jan 01 1988 - 14:34:32 EST

Did anyone else get this email with formatting errors? Unfortunately I cant

read it becuase of this. If you got this email with no formatting problems

could you forward me a copy? I would like to read this.

----- Original Message -----

From: "Glenn Morton" <glennmorton@entouch.net>

To: <asa@calvin.edu>

Sent: Thursday, June 23, 2005 11:18 PM

Subject: Why atheists believe in a universe capable of Judgment and

*> Prophecy
*

*> Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2005 17:42:10 -0500
*

*> Sender: asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu
*

*> Precedence: bulk
*

*>
*

*> This didn=E2=80=99t go through yesterday. I return to Beijing
*

*> tomorrow =
*

*> so won=E2=80=99t be able to discuss until Saturday. Thanks to
*

*> everyone =
*

*> for their prayers and concern, we don=E2=80=99t know what my wife has =
*

*> but it doesn=E2=80=99t appear to be cancer. =20
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> Why Atheists Believe in Eternal Judgment and Prophecy and
*

*> Don=E2=80=99t =
*

*> Even Know It. =20
*

*>
*

*> By Glenn R. Morton June, 2005
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> 'I do not mean to ask you to accept anything without reasonable ground =
*

*> for it. You will soon admit as much as I need from you. You know of =
*

*> course that a mathematical line, a line of thickness nil, has no real =
*

*> existence. They taught you that? Neither has a mathematical plane.
*

*> These =
*

*> things are mere abstractions.'
*

*>
*

*> 'That is all right,' said the Psychologist.
*

*>
*

*> 'Nor, having only length, breadth, and thickness, can a cube have a
*

*> real =
*

*> existence.'
*

*>
*

*> 'There I object,' said Filby. 'Of course a solid body may exist. All =
*

*> real things - '
*

*>
*

*> 'So most people think. But wait a moment. Can an instantaneous cube =
*

*> exist?'
*

*>
*

*> 'Don't follow you,' said Filby.
*

*>
*

*> 'Can a cube that does not last for any time at all, have a real =
*

*> existence?'=E2=80=9D=20
*

*>
*

*> (Wells, 1895, chapter 1)
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> Thus starts H. G. Well=E2=80=99s the Time Machine. The question he
*

*> asks =
*

*> gets to the heart of existence. Existence means or implies, a temporal =
*

*> duration. Without that, one can=E2=80=99t actually exist, or so it =
*

*> seems. As discussed in the last post, the existence of the universe
*

*> is a =
*

*> permanent gap in our understanding. In principle, the =
*

*> universe=E2=80=99s existence will never really be explained apart from =
*

*> positing god-like properties and/or powers to the universe or some =
*

*> constituent of the universe. =20
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> In 1949, Kurt Godel presented a novel solution to Einstein=E2=80=99s =
*

*> gravitational equations. The solution he presented is now known as =
*

*> Godel=E2=80=99s universe and it has profound implications to the =
*

*> science/theology debate. Godel=E2=80=99s paper, presented in a book
*

*> in =
*

*> honor of Einstein, argued that time does not exist. He argued that
*

*> time =
*

*> is an ideal, not real. Time is an illusion. His paper was met with =
*

*> silence, some say because he was an outsider to relativity and an =
*

*> outsider to philosophy. One will find occasional references to his
*

*> work =
*

*> in the relativistic literature but only to say that in rotating =
*

*> universes there are closed time-like paths(i.e. time travel is =
*

*> possible). Whatever the reason for the previous silence, his paper
*

*> has =
*

*> drawn much more interest in the past 10 years, due mainly to the
*

*> efforts =
*

*> of Palle Yourgrau, a philosopher at Brandeis University.
*

*> Godel=E2=80=99s =
*

*> argument has much to say about the nature of time and is worth
*

*> hearing. =
*

*> I will bring out some theological implications from this work.
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> The main point in writing this article is to show that if one follows
*

*> a =
*

*> reductionist path, one is forced into believing that the universe is
*

*> one =
*

*> which would allow things like prophecy and judgment, things which the =
*

*> secular world would rather omit from consideration. =20
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> The technical details of Godel=E2=80=99s bizarre universe is outlined
*

*> by =
*

*> Deser and Jackiw(1992) and can be found below the references. The
*

*> main =
*

*> item we need to pay attention to is that with a particular arrangement =
*

*> of matter in the universe, time travel is possible. Technically, there =
*

*> are closed time-like curves.
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> What are the implications of a closed time-like curves? Well, it means =
*

*> that a person can travel into his past in such a universe. Clearly
*

*> this =
*

*> implies all sorts of acausal paradoxes=E2=80=94things like killing
*

*> your =
*

*> grandmother before your mother was born. If you succeed, then you are =
*

*> not born and could not travel back into the past to kill her so she =
*

*> didn=E2=80=99t die and you were born. Most people who believe time =
*

*> travel is physically possible think that one can only do that which is =
*

*> logically possible to do thus ruling out killing granny. Most
*

*> physicists =
*

*> have rejected Godel=E2=80=99s universe because the mass distribution
*

*> he =
*

*> assumed is not observed in our universe. Thus, most have ignored =
*

*> Godel=E2=80=99s Universe and its implications. More on this below,
*

*> but =
*

*> suffice it to say that Godel=E2=80=99s argument includes arguments for =
*

*> the applicability to our world.
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> I will use Dorato=E2=80=99s reconstruction of the argument, which in =
*

*> outline is:
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> =E2=80=9C(0) Time is real only if change is real.
*

*>
*

*> (1) Change is real only if there exists an objective lapse of time. =
*

*> =C2=ABchange becomes possible only through the lapse of time=C2=BB =
*

*> (1949a, p. 558/1990, p. 202)
*

*>
*

*> (2) Time is real only if there exists an objective lapse of time [from =
*

*> (0) and (1)]
*

*>
*

*> (3) =C2=ABThe existence of an objective lapse of time means or at
*

*> least =
*

*> is equivalent to the fact, that reality consists of an infinity of =
*

*> layers of =E2=80=9Cnow=E2=80=9D which come into existence =
*

*> successively=C2=BB (1949a, p. 558/1990, p. 202).
*

*>
*

*> (4) Reality consist of an infinity of layers of =E2=80=9Cnow=E2=80=9D =
*

*> which come into existence successively only if spacetime admits of a =
*

*> global time function (cosmic time).
*

*>
*

*> (5) Time is real only if spacetime admits of a global time function =
*

*> [from (2), (3) (4)]
*

*>
*

*> (6) G=C3=B6del=E2=80=99s rotating-model M, qua solution to =
*

*> Einstein=E2=80=99s field equations, is a physically possible model,
*

*> and =
*

*> despite the presence of closed timelike curves (circular time) and =
*

*> looming grandfather paradoxes, cannot be ruled out a priori.
*

*>
*

*> (7) Since for every x in M, x chronologically precedes itself, M does =
*

*> not possess a global time function.
*

*>
*

*> (8) In the physically possible world M, time is ideal [from (5) (6) =
*

*> (7)]=E2=80=9D
*

*>
*

*> (9) The main, contingent, non-lawlike difference between M and our =
*

*> universe is given by the (probable) absence of a net rotation of
*

*> matter, =
*

*> which implies the existence of cosmic time in our world.=E2=80=9D =
*

*> (Dorato, 2001)
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> [the references 1949a are to Godel 1949 in this paper]
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> Let=E2=80=99s look at each step in the argument closely.
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> (0) Time is real only if change is real.
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> (1) Change is real only if there exists an objective lapse of time. =
*

*> =C2=ABchange becomes possible only through the lapse of time=C2=BB =
*

*> (1949a, p. 558/1990, p. 202)
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> The objections to these two assumptions is that it implies absolute =
*

*> change. It has also been objected that this appears to be the =
*

*> constantly moving =E2=80=98now=E2=80=99 concept and this is a view
*

*> which =
*

*> philosophers seem to have rejected. The way to interpret these two =
*

*> assumptions within Godel=E2=80=99s argument is that at time t certain =
*

*> events exist and at time t=E2=80=99 later than t, other events exist =
*

*> mind-independently. In other words, this implies that there is an =
*

*> objectiveness to the passage of time.
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> (2) Time is real only if there exists an objective lapse of time [from =
*

*> (0) and (1)] (Dorato, 2001).
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> This conclusion is logically deduced from the first two. =20
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> Readers will object that special relativity shows that there is no =
*

*> objective or global time but we still intuitively feel the passage of =
*

*> time, i.e. the present flowage of time into the existing present then =
*

*> into past. Godel is ready for that objection.
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> (3) =C2=ABThe existence of an objective lapse of time means or at
*

*> least =
*

*> is equivalent to the fact, that reality consists of an infinity of =
*

*> layers of =E2=80=9Cnow=E2=80=9D which come into existence =
*

*> successively=C2=BB (1949a, p. 558/1990, p. 202).
*

*>
*

*> (4) Reality consist of an infinity of layers of =E2=80=9Cnow=E2=80=9D =
*

*> which come into existence successively only if spacetime admits of a =
*

*> global time function (cosmic time).
*

*>
*

*> (5) Time is real only if spacetime admits of a global time function =
*

*> [from (2), (3) (4)](Dorato 2001)
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> Step 3 is an acknowledgement of McTaggart=E2=80=99s A-series. One can
*

*> go =
*

*> to J. M. E. McTaggart=E2=80=99s 1908 article in which he argues for
*

*> the =
*

*> ideality of time to see why time can=E2=80=99t be real if the world is =
*

*> governed by special relativity. McTaggart defined the A-series, the =
*

*> B-series. The B-series is a formal, geometricized time scale. 1776 =
*

*> will forever be after 2005, but 2005 will always be before 2006. The =
*

*> A-series is the ever present now, that dynamic present moment. Points =
*

*> come into existence during the now and go out of existence into the =
*

*> past. The point in step 4 concerns the need for each moment to =
*

*> =E2=80=98come into existence=E2=80=99. This is the intuitive =
*

*> understanding of time in which the future does not yet exist. =20
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> McTaggart, who notes that Kant, Spinoza, Hegel and Schopenaur believed =
*

*> in an idealized time, argued for an idealized time based upon the =
*

*> incompatibility of the A-series and the B-series.
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> =E2=80=9CIt would, I suppose, be universally admitted that time =
*

*> involves change. A particular thing, indeed, may exist unchanged
*

*> through =
*

*> any amount of time. But when we ask what we mean by saying that there =
*

*> were different moments of time, or a certain duration of time, through =
*

*> which the thing was the same, we find that we mean that it remained
*

*> the =
*

*> same while other things were changing. A universe in which nothing =
*

*> whatever changed (including the thoughts of the conscious beings in
*

*> it) =
*

*> would be a timeless universe.=E2=80=9D=20
*

*> =E2=80=9CIf, then, a B series without an A series can
*

*> constitute =
*

*> time, change must be possible without an A series. Let us suppose that =
*

*> the distinction of past, present and future does not apply to reality. =
*

*> Can change apply to reality? What is it that changes?=E2=80=9D
*

*> =E2=80=9CCould we say that, in a time which formed a B series
*

*> but =
*

*> not an A series, the change consisted in the fact that an event ceased =
*

*> to be an event, while another event began to be an event? If this were =
*

*> the case, we should certainly have got a change. =E2=80=9C
*

*> =E2=80=9CBut this is impossible. An event can never cease to
*

*> be an =
*

*> event. It can never get out of any time series in which it once =
*

*> is.=E2=80=9D (McTaggart, 1908)
*

*>
*

*> He then says:
*

*>
*

*> =E2=80=9CNeither can the change be looked for in the numerically =
*

*> different moments of absolute time, supposing such moments to exist.
*

*> For =
*

*> the same arguments will apply here. Each such moment would have its
*

*> own =
*

*> place in the B series, since each would be earlier or later than each
*

*> of =
*

*> the others. And as the B series indicate permanent relations, no
*

*> moment =
*

*> could ever cease to be, nor could it become another moment.=E2=80=9D =
*

*> (McTaggart, 1908)
*

*>
*

*> Once again, McTaggart=E2=80=99s line of reasoning leads him to believe =
*

*> that moments can not cease to be.
*

*>
*

*> The deduction that there is need for a global time function would rule =
*

*> out the compatibility of intuitive time with special relativity (step
*

*> 5) =
*

*> as Godel argues. He says that the A-series, the intuitive flow of
*

*> time, =
*

*> can not be real if special relativity is true.=20
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> =E2=80=9CThe opening move concerns the more limited special theory of =
*

*> relativity. Given that the A-series contains the flux of =
*

*> =E2=80=98now,=E2=80=99 the absence of an objective, worldwide "now" in =
*

*> special relativity rules out its ex=C2=ADistence. But absent the =
*

*> A-series there is no intuitive time. What remains, formal time as =
*

*> represented by the little "t" of Einstein-Minkowski space-time, cannot =
*

*> be identified with the intuitive time of everyday ex=C2=ADperience.
*

*> The =
*

*> conclusion, for Godel, is inescapable: if relativity theory is valid, =
*

*> intuitive time disappears.=E2=80=9D (Yourgrau, 2005, p. 128-129)
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> To re-iterate, if everyone has a different flow of time (something
*

*> true =
*

*> in special relativity) and there is no formal, global time, time
*

*> becomes =
*

*> entirely subjective and ideal. Another way of looking at this is that =
*

*> the A-series views future events as not yet existing, and past events =
*

*> and no longer existing. Only the present exists. Future events come =
*

*> into existence and then disappear into the past. This is incompatible =
*

*> with special relativity and mind-independent objective time since two =
*

*> observers will have different perceptions of what exists and what =
*

*> doesn=E2=80=99t. And this is where Godel brings down the hammer. He =
*

*> says, =E2=80=9CThe concept of existence (...) cannot be relativized =
*

*> without destroying its meaning completely.=E2=80=9D (Godel,1949, p. =
*

*> 559)
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> A moment of reality can not exist and not exist at the same time, and =
*

*> still retain the concept of existence. This is true as long as one =
*

*> accepts the concept that A and Not A are a contradictory. This is not =
*

*> the same as A plus Not A, which is a quantum mechanical statement of =
*

*> superposition.
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> Godel then reminds the reader that Special Relativity is just
*

*> that, =
*

*> special. It does not include accelerations. In General Relativity, a =
*

*> type of global time is allowed. It is the time of the clocks which
*

*> are =
*

*> co-moving with the average matter content of the universe(Peebles,
*

*> 1993, =
*

*> p. 112 note). This =E2=80=98global time=E2=80=99 is a good candidate =
*

*> for an objective time that Godel is looking for. However, Godel has a =
*

*> surprise in store.
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> (6) G=C3=B6del=E2=80=99s rotating-model M, qua solution to =
*

*> Einstein=E2=80=99s field equations, is a physically possible model,
*

*> and =
*

*> despite the presence of closed timelike curves (circular time) and =
*

*> looming grandfather paradoxes, cannot be ruled out a priori.
*

*>
*

*> (7) Since for every x in M, x chronologically precedes itself, M does =
*

*> not possess a global time function.
*

*>
*

*> (8) In the physically possible world M, time is ideal [from (5) (6) =
*

*> (7)]=E2=80=9D (Dorato, 2001)
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> Einstein presented a view of the world in which space-time is fully =
*

*> geometricized=E2=80=94the block universe, in which all events appear
*

*> as =
*

*> points in such a universe. Duration appears as lines moving through
*

*> the =
*

*> block. The paths through the block are subject to the mass
*

*> distribution =
*

*> in the universe. And this is where Godel pulls out his surprise.
*

*> Godel =
*

*> showed that if you had a rotating universe, that there would be closed =
*

*> time-like curves. If you are on one of these closed timelike paths,
*

*> you =
*

*> can travel forward in time but meet yourself in your past. In Godels =
*

*> universe, he showed how a rocket with a certain acceleration could =
*

*> enable one to travel back to the past and meet himself at an earlier =
*

*> time. Such a pathological universe was generally greeted by silence
*

*> on =
*

*> the part of philosophers and physicists. =20
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> Godel then argued that if one can visit himself in the past, the past =
*

*> has not really disappeared. After all, if you can visit New Jersey, =
*

*> then New Jersey must exist. And this brings into question the reality
*

*> of =
*

*> the A-series, in McTaggart=E2=80=99s terminology. We think the past
*

*> no =
*

*> longer exists and the future doesn=E2=80=99t exist yet. But if you =
*

*> appear from the future to tell yourself some trivial piece of =
*

*> information (like what stocks to buy) it also means that the future =
*

*> actually exists. It isn=E2=80=99t that great undetermined thing that
*

*> we =
*

*> normally think it is. Yourgrau writes:
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> =E2=80=9CBut if it is possible in such worlds, Godel argues, to return =
*

*> to one's past, then what was past never passed at all. But a time that =
*

*> never truly passes cannot pass for real, intuitive time. The reality
*

*> of =
*

*> time travel in the Godel universe signals the unreality of time. Once =
*

*> again, time disappears.=E2=80=9D (Yourgrau, 2005, p. 129-130)
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> The physicists rejected the universe as being =
*

*> =E2=80=98unphysical=E2=80=99. Our universe does not seem to be
*

*> rotating. =
*

*> Godel=E2=80=99s distribution of matter also required that the
*

*> galaxies =
*

*> stay rigidly separated, neither expanding or contracting towards each =
*

*> other.=20
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> Godel would counter argue that the physical reality of his mass =
*

*> distribution is not of importance in determining the truth or falsity
*

*> of =
*

*> what he says about time:
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> (9) The main, contingent, non-lawlike difference between M and our =
*

*> universe is given by the (probable) absence of a net rotation of
*

*> matter, =
*

*> which implies the existence of cosmic time in our world.=E2=80=9D =
*

*> (Dorato, 2001)
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> Afterall, he used the very same natural laws which govern our
*

*> universe. =
*

*> The only difference between Godel=E2=80=99s universe and ours is a =
*

*> contingency in the distribution of matter=E2=80=94e.g. an accident in =
*

*> how matter is arranged. I would suggest it would be like saying that =
*

*> just because all the roads to New Jersey have been destroyed =
*

*> doesn=E2=80=99t mean that New Jersey doesn=E2=80=99t exist. You may
*

*> not =
*

*> be able to visit it, but that is merely an accident due to the fact
*

*> that =
*

*> no roads are left in tact. Similarly, the fact that we can=E2=80=99t =
*

*> visit the past in our universe is merely an accident of the
*

*> distribution =
*

*> of matter. However, as we shall see, we very well might be able to
*

*> visit =
*

*> New Jersey.
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> Monday, I read a marvelous book by Richard Gott, called Time Travel
*

*> in =
*

*> Einstein=E2=80=99s Universe. He outlines several methods of time
*

*> travel =
*

*> in our universe assuming that there are cosmic strings and there is
*

*> some =
*

*> evidence for their existence.
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> =E2=80=9CThe mysterious gamma rays that emanate from the central bulge =
*

*> of our galaxy could arise from a seething tangle of =E2=80=98cosmic =
*

*> strings=E2=80=99.=E2=80=9D (anonymous, 2005, p. 16)=20
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> While that is a possible tangle of strings, if you have two strings =
*

*> moving past each other at rapid velocities Deser and Jackiw (1992) =
*

*> state:
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> =E2=80=9CThe reason for current interest in time travel ideas derives =
*

*> from the recent realization that infinitely long and arbitrarily thin =
*

*> cosmic strings can support closed time-like curves.=E2=80=9D
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> Gott states,
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> =E2=80=9CTo allow time travel to the past, cosmic strings with a =
*

*> mass-per-unit length of about 10 million billion tons per centimeter =
*

*> must each move in opposite directions at speeds of at least
*

*> 99.999999996 =
*

*> percent the speed of light. We have observed high-energy protons in
*

*> the =
*

*> universe moving at least this fast, so such speeds are =
*

*> possible.=E2=80=9D (Gott, 2001, p. 104)
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> And Tipler has a solution which allows time travel in our universe:
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> =E2=80=9CFrank Tipler, now at Tulane University, found that if you
*

*> have =
*

*> an infinitely tall cylinder rotating at nearly the speed of light on
*

*> its =
*

*> surface, you could go back in time by flying around the cylinder. This =
*

*> solution is reminiscent of mine, with the two infinite cosmic strings =
*

*> passing each other.=E2=80=9D(Gott, 2001, p. 117)
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> There is one more interesting counter argument to Godel=E2=80=99s =
*

*> possible universe. If the multiverse is true, then Godel=E2=80=99s =
*

*> universe is not merely a possible universe, it is a real universe =
*

*> somewhere in the multiverse. There are only 2^(10^118) (Tegmark,
*

*> 2003, =
*

*> p. 42) different ways to arrange matter in a universe the size of our =
*

*> observable universe. If the multiverse consists of all possible =
*

*> universes (as Hawking=E2=80=99s wave equation of the universe would =
*

*> include all possible universes(Kaku, 1994, p. 254), and that should =
*

*> include Godel=E2=80=99s universe, making it a real item.=20
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> Today we know of many arrangements of matter which will allow time =
*

*> travel in our universe with our distribution of matter, and this has =
*

*> theological implications. We CAN visit New Jersy. These time machine =
*

*> solutions mean that the past isn=E2=80=99t non-existent. It also
*

*> means =
*

*> that the future isn=E2=80=99t non-existent. It means that our
*

*> intuitive =
*

*> time, the A-series, in which past and future are non-existent is not =
*

*> real as McTaggart argued in 1908. And that has implications to whether =
*

*> or not there is real change in the universe as opposed to perceived =
*

*> change. And as McTaggart says:
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> =E2=80=9CNeither can the change be looked for in the numerically =
*

*> different moments of absolute time, supposing such moments to exist.
*

*> For =
*

*> the same arguments will apply here. Each such moment would have its
*

*> own =
*

*> place in the B series, since each would be earlier or later than each
*

*> of =
*

*> the others. And as the B series indicate permanent relations, no
*

*> moment =
*

*> could ever cease to be, nor could it become another moment.=E2=80=9D =
*

*> (McTaggart, 1908)
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> And
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> =E2=80=9CWithout the A series then, there would be no change,
*

*> and =
*

*> consequently the B series by itself is not sufficient for time, since =
*

*> time involves change.=E2=80=9D (McTaggart 1908)
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> Consider the implications of this for chance. A physicist travels back =
*

*> into the past to visit his aging father again before he died 10 years =
*

*> ago. Ten years ago he had set up an experiment to observe virtual =
*

*> particles via the Lamb-Retherford shift. Before going to see his =
*

*> father, he stops by the office to check the experiment. If he is =
*

*> actually in the past, the jitters of the electron circling the
*

*> hydrogen =
*

*> atom should be the same, the very same in this past as it was 10 years =
*

*> ago when he performed the experiment. The only difference is that
*

*> this =
*

*> time he feels he is the guy walking in the door to see himself
*

*> standing =
*

*> over the equipment instead of being the guy who was standing over the =
*

*> equipment seeing himself walk in. To visit the actual past means that =
*

*> virtual particles, those paragons of random chance, can=E2=80=99t =
*

*> possibly be random at all but are fixed into the block universe of the =
*

*> B-series=E2=80=94the 4D manifold of General Relativity. Time travel =
*

*> destroys chance being anything other than the illusion of chance like =
*

*> that we get from most random number generators in our computers. Like =
*

*> the output from the old GWBasic language where one could get the same =
*

*> =E2=80=98random=E2=80=99 sequence time and time again by specifying
*

*> the =
*

*> same seed number, the universe would yield the same pattern of virtual =
*

*> particles every time you visited your aging father in the past.
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> Well if chance dies in the block universe, then determinism reins,
*

*> only =
*

*> we don=E2=80=99t know what is determined. We live in the A-series and =
*

*> can=E2=80=99t look at the B-series. But God can. That means that =
*

*> prophecy is allowed because God=E2=80=99s laws, the laws which allow =
*

*> time travel, allow Him to know what the future holds. And more than =
*

*> that, such a block universe would absolutely mean that judgement can =
*

*> occur. If you stand before the divine being who is looking at your
*

*> life =
*

*> and you object that you were really a good guy and didn=E2=80=99t
*

*> murder =
*

*> 487 people, God can give you a glimpse of your timeline, effectively =
*

*> giving a trial by replay for your benefit.
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> What does this do to free will? Clearly this is where everyone will =
*

*> complain. Indeed, I don=E2=80=99t like this aspect of Godel=E2=80=99s =
*

*> argument. Free will is a form of intentionality and physics has
*

*> little =
*

*> to say about how that arises:
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> =E2=80=9CIn the hierarchy of complexity, each level links to the one =
*

*> above: chemistry links to biochemistry, to cell biology, physiology, =
*

*> psychology, to sociology, economics and politics. Particle physics is =
*

*> the foundational subject underlying=E2=80=94and so in some sense =
*

*> explaining=E2=80=94all the others. In a reductionist world view,
*

*> physics =
*

*> is all there is. The Cartesian picture of man as a machine seems to be =
*

*> vindicated.
*

*> =E2=80=9CBut this view omits important aspects of the world that =
*

*> physics has yet to come to terms with. Our environment is dominated by =
*

*> objects that embody the outcomes of intentional design (buildings,
*

*> books =
*

*> computers, teaspoons). Today=E2=80=99s physics has nothing to say
*

*> about =
*

*> the intentionality that has resulted in the existence of such objects, =
*

*> even though this intentionality is clearly causally
*

*> effective.=E2=80=9D =
*

*> (Ellis, 2005, p. 743.)
*

*>
*

*> But, this is not what one usually means by the term intentionality.
*

*> In =
*

*> the block view of the universe one could give a reductionist view of =
*

*> intentionality. The very electrons in our brains would be determined =
*

*> and (yes this is physicalism) thus our thoughts. For those who =
*

*> don=E2=80=99t think that our thoughts are determined by our brains,
*

*> look =
*

*> what happens to someone whose brain is scrambled by some horrible =
*

*> accident. Their thoughts get scrambled as well.
*

*>
*

*> How are we held accountable? I don=E2=80=99t know. Godel=E2=80=99s =
*

*> argument for the existence of time travel seems to preclude free
*

*> will. =
*

*> I can think of two ways this might not be. First if, as Hawking has =
*

*> suggested, quantum considerations rule out time travel. This is often =
*

*> called the Chronology protection conjecture. Hawking claimed that the =
*

*> vacuum would always blow up creating a singularity as you approached
*

*> an =
*

*> area of the space time which would allow time travel. The biggest =
*

*> complaint against this is that it seems to be ad hoc.
*

*>
*

*> Secondly, one might be able to avoid this conundrum when the full =
*

*> quantum mechanical gravitation is finally developed.
*

*>
*

*> Thirdly, Dorato (2001) believes that Godel failed in proving the =
*

*> ideality of time. That being said, I find his objections to be weak.
*

*> He =
*

*> denies the postulate that one can=E2=80=99t relativize existence.
*

*> But, =
*

*> if he is right, then one can get out of Godel=E2=80=99s argument, but =
*

*> maybe not out of the fact that both future and past must still exist
*

*> if =
*

*> time travel is to be considered a physical possibility given =
*

*> Einstein=E2=80=99s equations.
*

*>
*

*> Now, before people misunderstand the reason I am writing this (I am
*

*> sure =
*

*> people will write responses before getting to this place in the text)
*

*> I =
*

*> am writing primarily to suggest to the atheist that if they do engage
*

*> in =
*

*> reductionism, they end up with a universe which is quite capable of =
*

*> things like prophecy and eternal judgment, qualities which they deny.
*

*> My =
*

*> personal reasoning was that I finally got tired of being looked upon
*

*> as =
*

*> the village idiot by atheists, who think they are oh so intellectual, =
*

*> and yet they don=E2=80=99t realize that they must have something as
*

*> the =
*

*> creator of the universe and that if they are logically consistent in =
*

*> believing science, they end up with a universe capable of all the
*

*> things =
*

*> the theist says.=20
*

*>
*

*> Do I believe in a totally reductionist universe? No, of course not.
*

*> Do I =
*

*> believe that all my actions are determined? No, but I believe this in =
*

*> spite of the line of logic above. My belief isn=E2=80=99t science; my =
*

*> belief is faith. I will defend the line of logic, but I will not
*

*> defend =
*

*> the view and I would appreciate the responders remembering this =
*

*> distinction. The views are not something that I am advocating but =
*

*> something I am trying to say that one must hold if one is a radical =
*

*> reductionist. In general, atheism holds to a radical reductionism.
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> References.=20
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> Anonymous, 2005. =E2=80=9CMystery Rays Could Be Sign of Cosmic =
*

*> Strings,=E2=80=9D New Scientist, June 4, 2005
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> Deser, S. and Jackiw, R., 1992. =E2=80=9CTIME TRAVEL?=E2=80=9D
*

*> Extended =
*

*> version of talk presented at =E2=80=9846 LNS 46 Cambridge, MA,May
*

*> 1992=20
*

*>
*

*> http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/hep-th/pdf/9206/9206094.pdf
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> Dorato, Mauro 2001 =E2=80=9CON BECOMING, COSMIC TIME AND ROTATING =
*

*> UNIVERSES,=E2=80=9D Forthcoming in C. Callender (ed.), Time, Reality
*

*> and =
*

*> Experience (provisional title), Royal Institute of Philosophy Series, =
*

*> Cambridge University Press, 2001) =
*

*> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000150/00/becoming.pdf
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> Ellis, George F. R., 2005. =E2=80=9CPhysics, Complexity and =
*

*> Causality,=E2=80=9D Nature, 435:(June 9):743
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> Godel, Kurt, 1949. =E2=80=9CA Remark about the Relationshiip Between =
*

*> Relativity Theory and Idealistic Philosophy, in P. A. Schilp, ed.
*

*> Albert =
*

*> Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist (La Salle, Il: Open Court). p. 557-562
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> Gott, Richard, 2001. Time Travel in Einstein=E2=80=99s Universe, (New =
*

*> York: Houghton Mifflin Co.)
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> Kaku, Michio, 1994, Hyperspace, (New York: Anchor Books).
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> McTaggart, John Ellis, 1908. =E2=80=9CThe Unreality of Time, Mind: A =
*

*> Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy, 17:456-473. =
*

*> http://www.ditext.com/mctaggart/time.html
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> Peebles, P. J. E. 1993. Principles of Physical Cosmology, (Princeton: =
*

*> Princeton University Press)
*

*>
*

*> Max Tegmark, 2003 =E2=80=9CParallel Universes,=E2=80=9D Scientific =
*

*> American, May.
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> H. G. Wells, The Time Machine, 1895=20
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> Yourgrau, Palle, 2005. A World Without Time, (New York: Perseus Books).
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> Godel=E2=80=99s Universe
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> =E2=80=9CGodel took T[mu,nu] to be a space-time constant, not
*

*> vanishing =
*

*> only in its time-time component (energy density),
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> T[infinity] =3Dc^4/8=CF=80G > 0 . (5)
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> The metric tensor that then solves Einstein=E2=80=99s equations leads
*

*> to =
*

*> the space-time interval
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> ds^2 =3D g[mu,nu] dx^[mu] dx^[nu]=20
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> =3D {cdt =E2=88=92 =E2=88=9A2/[Lambda] (cosh=E2=88=9A[Lambda]r =
*

*> =E2=88=92 1)d[theta]}^2 =E2=88=92 dr^2 =E2=88=92 1/[Lambda] sinh^2 =
*

*> =E2=88=9A[Lambda]r d[theta]^2 =E2=88=92 dz^2 , (6)
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> where r, [theta] are planar circular coordinates, with [theta] =3D 0
*

*> and =
*

*> 2[pi] identified, and there is no interesting structure in the =
*

*> z-direction. A curve x^[mu](=CF=84) is closed and time-like if both =
*

*> x=C2=B5(0) =3D x^[mu](1) (closed) and (ds/d=CF=84)^2 =3D g=C2=B5=CE=BD =
*

*> (dx^[mu]/d=CF=84) (dx^[nu]/d=CF=84) > 0 (time-like). It is therefore =
*

*> clear that a circular path in the Godel universe for which t, r and z =
*

*> remain constant, while [theta] varies from 0 to 2[pi], is closed and =
*

*> time-like provided cosh=E2=88=9A[Lambda]r > 3, i.e., r > =
*

*> 2/=E2=88=9A[Lambda] ln(1 + =E2=88=9A2 ).=E2=80=9D (Deser & Jackiw,1992)
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> If you hold t,r, and z constant, dt, dr and dz go to zero and all you =
*

*> have left is the d[theta] terms. Setting ds^2 =3D 0 and solving for r =
*

*> yields the answer in the above citation.
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

*> =20
*

*>
*

Received on Sat Jun 25 12:29:37 2005

*
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8
: Sat Jun 25 2005 - 12:29:39 EDT
*