Moorad wrote: "I have defined science by its subject matter, which is
data that can, in
principle, be detected by physical devices. Is that consistent with
methodological naturalism? And, if so, why use an "ism" in the definition
I'm not uncomfortable with your definition, but I may not have thought it
thorough completely, so I have not (yet) adopted it. Is it consistent
with MN? I think so,
As far as "using an 'ism'" in defining science, I'm not sure I'm doing
that. I am arguing that MN is a foundational assumption of science.
Plantinga has a couple of recent articles arguing for two kinds of
"science," one assuming MN and one not. You can read these in the ARN
journals of a year or two ago. To me, they were interesting, but not
If you are uncomfortable with "isms," then substitute for the term
"methodological naturalism" (which I think is admirably descriptive,
lucid and clear) a generally synonymous phrase "study of natural
causation." It's the same thing, albeit (IMHO) a little more vague.
Hope you had a good holiday, my friend.
John Burgeson (Burgy)
(science/theology, quantum mechanics, baseball, ethics,
humor, cars, God's intervention into natural causation, etc.)
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