> > Like the other physicists here, I simply don't see how the possibility for new types of organization to be introduced without there being corresponding changes in the properties of matter and its interactions, and thus in the laws that describe the physical world - whether those laws deal with particles or fields, or are classical or quantum.<
> I would take Peter's model of God selecting an extremely improbable outcome to produce a novel structure as an example of introducing a new type of organization without a change in the laws of physics. Similarly, creating some entity ex nihilo (e.g., the first cell) and then letting it carry on under ordinary providence would not require an alteration of the laws of physics, though they would be set aside in the creation event itself.
Peter's model doesn't involve the possibility for a new type of organization but merely the realization of a situation that we might have expected, on statistical grounds, not to have happened for a much longer time.
With your second example, the question would be whether or not the first cell could have come about in accord with the laws of physics prior to its appearance. If so, its creation ex nihilo was unnecessary. If not, then something has happened that cannot be explained by the laws of physics.
George L. Murphy
"The Science-Theology Interface"
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