>From: "bivalve" <email@example.com>
> I would take Peter's model of God selecting an extremely improbable outcome
> to produce a novel structure as an example of introducing a new type of
> organization without a change in the laws of physics.
Food for thought: (1) In Peter's model, does God only select, or does God
both select and cause to happen? (2) Is the idea of free creaturely action
-- without additional influence from a non-material being -- part of what is
described by the "laws of physics"? If so, then does the removal of that
freedom constitute a change in the law?
> Similarly, creating
> some entity ex nihilo (e.g., the first cell) and then letting it carry on
> under ordinary providence would not require an alteration of the laws of
> physics, though they would be set aside in the creation event itself.
More food: (1) Could this distinction be simply a matter of whether or not
particular "laws of physics" were set aside permanently (and replaced by
others) or only temporarily (with the original laws reinstated after the
lapse)? (2) Whether permanently or temporarily, would some form of
supernatural action be required?
Howard Van Till
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Mon Dec 17 2001 - 19:55:01 EST