>the club's charter had been drafted explicitly to exclude
>minorities. "Persons of African descent," declared the document,
>"shall be excluded from membership."
>When this was brought to the attention of the club's board,
>they said, "Oh, sorry. We never meant to say that."
>So they revised the charter. Now it read: "This club does
>not discriminate against persons of African descent. We
>cannot, because, in principle, we take no notice of them
If the "country club" is science, and if science = truth, then it is
true (as Paul says) that "methodological naturalism...gives the
philosophical naturalist everything he could ever want, in dealing with
But there are two ways to discredit a support of philosophical
naturalism by science -- we can challenge: 1) an implication that "science
= truth" or 2) the MN-claim that "science, in principle, cannot include
If theism is true, the first challenge is certainly valid. And I'm
becoming more convinced that a good case is being made (by Paul and others)
for the second challenge. These two challenges seem to be logically
compatible; combining *both* is possible (and this may be the most
effective strategy), or we could use *either* by itself; but it does not
seem wise to never take a clear stand at either of these points, in a
theistic (not deistic) view of nature.